Corporate Governance against Systematic Risk during COVID-19 -- Empirical Findings Based on fs/QCA

Chih-Yi Hsiao^1, , Qing-Ru Yan¹, Di Yang¹ and Rui-Xiong Zhu¹

¹Xiamen University Tan Kah Kee College, Zhangzhou, China

Cite this paper

Chih-Yi Hsiao, Qing-Ru Yan, Di Yang and Rui-Xiong Zhu. Corporate Governance against Systematic Risk during COVID-19 -- Empirical Findings Based on fs/QCA. Journal of Business and Management Sciences. 2022; 10(1):30-38. doi: 10.12691/JBMS-10-1-4

Abstract

Based on samples of listed Chinese companies, we use fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) to explore the relationship between corporate governance and systematic risk during COVID-19. Our findings are as follows: 1) Good corporate governance can slash the impact of systematic risk, and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more resistant to systematic risk. 2) Enterprises with both good board and ownership structures can reduce systematic risk by enhancing the benign interaction with stakeholders through information disclosure, a deed that will, on the contrary, increase business risks. 3) If the members of the board have the concept of governance and related professional background, there is no need to increase the proportion of independent directors. 4) The higher the shareholding ratio of the top ten shareholders or the more dispersed overall equity of a company, the more significantly positive effect on stabilizing its operation; a poorly operated enterprise may diminish its operation risks by increasing the proportion of institutional shareholders and inviting them to participate in the company’s operation. Based on the above findings, we put forward corresponding suggestions for enterprises and regulators.

Keywords

corporate governance, systematic risk, fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Copyright

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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